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We derive a finite-horizon version of the Shapiro-Stiglitz shirking model of unemployment. 
Workers’ behavior may change as they approach the end of an employment contract.  
Our model predicts that wages should be rising in age for an unchanged rate of 
unemployment.  
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1. Introduction 
Every employment contract has a time dimension. There are workers on temporary 
contracts; workers who have been given an advance notice of dismissal know that their 
days on the job are numbered; and even workers who have safe permanent jobs realize 
that they will eventually retire. In this paper we extend and generalize the well-known 
model of wage setting by Shapiro and Stiglitz (S-S) (1984) to show how a worker’s 
propensity to shirk his duties varies from the beginning to the end of an employment 
contract.  
 
2. A non-perpetual model  
We model a worker’s effort decision when he has finite horizons leaving the infinite 
horizon case described in the S-S paper as a special case. There are three states of 
intertemporal utilities in the S-S model for workers with transitory probabilities to 
alternative states. These are the value of being employed, VE (when not shirking) and VS 
(when shirking), and the value of being unemployed, VU. Workers receive the wage w 
when employed and unemployment benefits bu when unemployed. Effort is exerted when 
employed workers are not shirking their duties while no effort is exerted when workers 
shirk. Workers discount future utility at rate ρ, face a constant probability of job 
termination b during the contract period and the probability q of being fired if caught 
shirking. 
We start with a representative state i  
      ( ) ( )s ti itV u s e dsρ
∞
− −
= ∫ ,                                              (1) 
with transitory probability pij of moving to the alternative state jV ,where ( )iu s  is the 
immediate utility at time s for the state i. We can now introduce finite horizons by 
dividing the inter-temporal integral iV into the periods of t time T≤ ≤  and T time≤ ≤ ∞  
where T denotes the time remaining until the end of horizon: 
         ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Ts t s t s ti i i it t TV u s e ds u s e ds u s e dsρ ρ ρ
∞ ∞
− − − − − −
= = +∫ ∫ ∫ .                (2) 
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The integral ( ) ( )s tiT u s e dsρ
∞
− −
∫  for time period T time≤ ≤ ∞  can be rewritten as follows 
        ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )s t T t s Ti iT Tu s e ds e u s e dsρ ρ ρ
∞ ∞
− − − − − −
=∫ ∫ .                            (3) 
Therefore, we need to discount the integral by the factor ( )ijp T te− −  if we would like to 
replace T with t since over the time period from t to T, the integral ( ) ( )s TiT u s e dsρ
∞
− −
∫  
depreciates at the rate of pij: 
     
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )ijp T tT t s T s ti iT te u s e ds e u s e ds
ρρ ρ ρ∞ ∞− + −− − − − − −
=∫ ∫ .                    (4) 
Equation (2) can now be rewritten as 
     ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ij ijT p T t p T ts t s t Ti i i i it tV u s e ds e u s e ds V e V
ρ ρρ ρ∞− + − − + −− − − −
= + = +∫ ∫ ,        (5) 
where ( ) ( )T s tTi itV u s e dsρ− −= ∫ . Rearranging gives 
      ( )( ) .1 ij
T
i
i p T t
VV
e
ρ− + −
=
−
                                                (6) 
Equation (6) shows the relationship between the perpetual and non-perpetual 
intertemporal integrals for the state i. One can then apply equation (6) to three states: EV , 
SV , and UV , with corresponding transitory probabilities: pEU = b, pSU = b+q, and pUE = a, 
where ( ) ( )T s tTE tV w e e dsρ− −= −∫  is the non-perpetual integral for the value of being a non-
shirking employed worker who faces the probability b of moving to the unemployed state, 
̅ is the disutility of effort, ( )
T s tT
S t
V we dsρ− −= ∫  is the non-perpetual integral for the value 
of being a shirking worker who faces the probability b+q of moving to the unemployment 
state and ( )
T s tT
U ut
V b e dsρ− −= ∫  is the non-perpetual integral for an unemployed worker who 
becomes employed with probability a, which denotes the probability of finding jobs. 
We can derive the following three asset pricing equations by substituting equation 
(6) into the Bellman equations of the perpetual case of the S-S model; 
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        ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )11 1
b T t
b T tT T T
E U Ea T t
eV w e e b V V
e
ρ
ρ
ρρ
− + −
− + −
− + −
 
−
= − − + −  
− 
,                      (7) 
         
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )11 1
b q T t
b q T tT T T
S U Sa T t
eV w e b q V V
e
ρ
ρ
ρρ
− + + −
− + + −
− + −
 
−
= − + + −  
− 
,                    (8) 
         
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )11 1
a T t
a T tT T T
U u E Ub T t
eV b e a V V
e
ρ
ρ
ρρ
− + −
− + −
− + −
 
−
= − + −  
− 
.                      (9) 
Using the no-shirking condition such that T TE SV V= for equation (8) gives 
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )11 1
b q T t
b q T tT T T
E U Ea T t
eV w e b q V V
e
ρ
ρ
ρρ
− + + −
− + + −
− + −
 
−
= − + + −  
− 
.                (10) 
There are three unknown variables, TEV , TUV , w , for (7), (9) and (10). Rearranging those 
three equations gives 
        ( )
( )( )
( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1
1
b T t
b T t b T tT T
E Ua T t
eb V b V w e e e
e
ρ
ρ ρ
ρρ
− + −
− + − − + −
− + −
 
−
+ − − − = − −  
− 
,   (11) 
        ( ) ( )
( )( )
( )( )
( )( )( )1 1 0
1
b q T t
b q T tT T
E Ua T t
eb q V b q V w e
e
ρ
ρ
ρρ
− + + −
− + + −
− + −
 
−
+ + − + − − =  
− 
,        (12) 
        
( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1 11
a T t
a T tT T
E U ub T t
e
a V a V b e
e
ρ
ρ
ρ ρ
− + −
− + −
− + −
 
−
− + = − −  
− 
.           (13) 
Finally, using Cramer’s rule gives the no-shirking condition for wages (see Appendix for 
details) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
1
,
1
u u
B A ea b q b b b q B A b q e a b q
w
B A b a aq q
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
− + − + + + + + + +  
=
− + + + +  
   
 (14) 
where ( )( )( )1 b T tA e ρ− + −= −  and ( )( )( )1 b q T tB e ρ− + + −= − . Note that since A < B we find that 
(1 – B/A) is negative. The numerator of (14) falls faster than the denominator and the firm 
needs to pay wages that rise as the end of the contract period approaches. Because the 
effective discount rates for the shirking state is b qρ + +  and higher than the effective 
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discount rate for the non-shirking state bρ + , shirking is less harmful to workers whose 
contract will expire soon.  
For the perpetual case, we have A=B. Thus the no-shirking condition becomes  
 
( ) ( )b q e a b q euw b e a buq q
ρ ρ ρ
ρ
ρ
+ + + +
= = + + + +
 ,                      (15) 
which is the original no-shirking condition of Shapiro and Stiglitz. Now denote the 
number of employed workers of age t by Lt. In steady state, the outflow from 
employment to unemployment equals bLt and should equal to inflow of workers from 
unemployment to employment a(Nt-Lt) where Nt is the number of workers of age t in the 
labor force. 
     ( )t t tbL a N L= − .                                                   (16) 
Thus ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1t t t t t t t t t ta b bL N L b bN N L bN N L b u− − −+ = − + = − = − =  and we get 
( )1 t ta b u u= − . Substituting back into (14) gives the no-shirking condition in 
equilibrium as a relationship between wages and unemployment. 
                  
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
1 1
1 1 1
.
1 1 1
t t u
t t t t
u t
t t t t
B A eb u u b q b b b q
w
B A b b u u b u u q q
B A b q e b u q
B A b b u u b u u q q
ρ
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
 
− − + − + + 
=
 
− + + − + − + 
+ + +
+
 
− + + − + − + 
     (17)    
It follows that each cohort of workers has a distinct wage curve – or no-shirking 
constraint – described by equation (17).  
The non-shirking constraint is drawn in Figure 1 below as an upward-sloping non-
shirking constraint for different age groups with benchmark values below the figure.  
There are only small differences between young and middle-aged workers. But the wage 
curves for older workers are substantially higher. It follows that the wage – or 
unemployment – needed to prevent a 40-year old worker from shirking his duties is not 
much higher than that needed to prevent a 20 year old worker from doing so but a 
significantly higher wage is needed to prevent a 50 year old worker from shirking than is 
the case of the 40 year old one.  
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As shown in Figure 2 we find that the wage required to prevent shirking rises rapidly in 
the 44-48 years age group when unemployment is 10%, in the 48-52 years age group 
when unemployment is 20% and in the 52-56 group when unemployment is a staggering 
40%.                            
 
 
3. Discussion 
Our model predicts that wages need to increase as a worker approaches the end of a 
contract when it is difficult to monitor effort and unemployment is held constant. It 
follows that wages are increasing in age for a given unemployment rate. The model 
describes wage setting in labor markets where there is substantial asymmetric 
information about workers’ effort and monitoring is difficult, such as the market for 
professionals, managers, educated workers and also in large firms.  In such markets older 
workers will either face a higher unemployment rate, which reduces the cost of 
employing them, be more productive due to experience or pushed into retirement.  
We are not the first to propose an explanation for wages rising faster than 
productivity with age. Lazear (1979, 1981) derived a model where wages are set below 
productivity for young workers and then above productivity for workers approaching 
retirement for incentive reasons, hence also providing a justification for mandatory 
retirement. Another explanation for rising wage profiles is that of Frank and Hutchens 
(1993) who assume that satisfaction depends on the rate of change of consumption. 
Rising wage profiles may be desired by workers who find it difficult to postpone 
consumption through voluntary savings.  
While rising wage profiles may provide incentives and be desired by the 
workforce our model provides additional insights into the relationship between time until 
retirement and productivity. There is evidence that the behavior of workers may change 
as they approach the end of tenure. Figlio (1995) found that the decision to retire from 
politics results in political shirking – meaning less party discipline – using a multi-year 
panel data set. Tien (2001) also found that voluntarily retiring members of Congress 
shirked by failing to represent the interests of their constituents. Parker and Powers 
(2002) found that spending on foreign travel is higher among members of Congress who 
are about to leave office. DeBacker (2012) detects shirking by senators in their last term 
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that is limited by political parties that constrain the politician depending on his post-
Senate career choices. In sports, Krautmann and Solow (2009) examined incentives in 
baseball contracts and found that players who are less likely to sign a subsequent contract 
showed worse performance.  
There are empirical studies that support the predictions of our model. Medoff and 
Abraham (1981) find an association between experience and relative earning but no 
association between experience and relative performance for managers and professionals 
in two large U.S. companies. Dostie (2006) use Canadian data and finds that productivity 
is lower than wages for older workers who have at least an undergraduate degree 
although the evidence on the direct effect of age on productivity is mixed. Lallemand and 
Ryck (2009) attribute low employment rates among older workers in Belgium to older 
workers being more costly to employ and less productive than prime age workers. 
Studying productivity data from large Belgian firms they find that a higher share of older 
workers lowers average productivity. In contrast, Börsch-Supan and Weiss (2008) study 
productivity in a German car manufacturing company and find that experience keeps the 
productivity of older workers from falling by giving them an ability to avoid making 
serious errors.  
 
4. Conclusions 
By extending the model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) we have found that workers 
tendency to shirk their duties increases as they approach the end of tenure. Moreover, the 
threat of unemployment has a smaller effect on these workers requiring firms to raise 
their wages or make them redundant.   
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Appendix 
Equations (11)-(13) can be written as follows: 
(A1) ( ) T TE UAb V b V Aw AeCρ + − − = − , 
(A2) ( ) ( ) 0T TE UBb q V b q V BwCρ + + − + − = , 
(A3) ( )T TE U uCa V a V CbA ρ− + = − , 
where ( )( )( )1 b T tA e ρ− + −= − , ( )( )( )1 b q T tB e ρ− + + −= − , and ( )( )( )1 a T tC e ρ− + −= − . 
Cramer’s rule gives the solutions for no-shirking conditions wages 
 
(A4)                       
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
0
.
0
u
Ab b Ae
C
Bb q b q
C
C
a a Cb
A
w
Ab b A
C
Bb q b q B
C
C
a a
A
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
+ − −
+ + − +
− + −
=
+ − −
+ + − + −
− +
 
 
Expanding the determinants gives 
(A5)  ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) .
u uBb b b q Ae b q a Bae b q Abb b q
w
A b q a Bab Ba b q B b a
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
+ + + + + + − + − + +
=
+ + + + − + − + +
 
Equation (A5) can further be simplified as follows, 
 
(A6)  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
  
1
  .
1
u u
u u
u u
B A b b b q Bb q A B ea b q Ae a b q
w
A B b a aq A q
A B ea b q b b b q Bb q Ae a b q
A B b a aq A q
B A ea b q b b b q B A b q e a b q
B A b a aq q
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
− + + + + − + + + + +
=
− + + + +  
− + − + + + + + + +  
=
− + + + +  
− + − + + + + + + +  
=
− + + + +  
 
  
                          
                          Figure 1. Age-dependent wage curves
Parameter values: ρ  = 0.1, 
that age = 20; and T=5 means that age = 60, if we assume that age 65 is the age at which 
workers are no longer willing to work. 
 
 
                                 Figure 2. The non
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b = 0.1, q = 0.3, e = 1.0, bu = 1, N = 1000. Note that T=45 implies 
 
-shirking wage and age 
 
Same as in Figure 1.  
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